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After a successful meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents, Robert Kocharian and Heidar Aliyev, in Key West, Florida from 3-7 April, the co-chairs wanted to broaden the constituency for peace in the region. They designed a route that took in the sections of the population which are most affected by the stalemate: in Azerbaijan, displaced people; in Armenia, people suffering because of the economic isolation of their country. They also want to open up three routes across the Line of Contact, which can be used by aid agencies and mediators. Last year they made two crossings across the Armenia-Azerbaijan frontier, which has also been closed. This third crossing was the most sensitive because it took place in what is the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan. After attending a meeting between the
co-chairs and President Aliyev on 18 May in the Azerbaijani capital
Baku, we flew by helicopter to the refugee camp at Agcabedi in
western Azerbaijan. Here, as everywhere throughout the region,
the mediators were besieged by From the camp we flew to the "no-fly
zone" near the Line of Contact that divides the two sides.
In minibuses we travelled to the Azerbaijan post, to be met by
Colonel Elkhan Husseinov who led us down a narrow strip of country
road that had been de-mined only that morning. The scene was
peaceful, the uncultivated fields around had grown tall thistles
since the 1994 ceasefire agreement. After five minutes we reached
a group of soldiers, wearing almost identical But if this crossing was a breakthrough
of sorts, it also pointed up the enormous gulf that these few
meters of ceasefire-line represent. The handshake between Col
Husseinov and the Karabakhi Armenian, Major-General Vitaly Balasanian
was so quick that I did not catch it. We walked back across no-man's land with
the Armenians and then spent a day in the hills of Nagorno-Karabakh,
now a self-proclaimed separatist Armenian state. On 20 May we
flew by helicopter to Armenia and spoke to the poor and unemployed
of the northern Armenian towns On 21 May the group of journalists met
with Armenian president, Robert Kocharian. The mood was downbeat.
A final briefing with the US mediator Carey Cavanaugh confirmed
the general tenor of the trip. Both presidents had returned from
Florida to hold consultations with Problems There is a central question here, which forces one to question the motives of the two leaders: If they are committed to a peace settlement, but the public is hostile, why do they not do more to sell the idea of compromise to their people? Since Key West, developments on this front
have been very discouraging. At a ceremony on 9 May, Aliyev said
that just as German aggression had been punished in 1945, so
Armenian aggression should be. As for Kocharian, when the group
of journalists directly asked So why are the two presidents, who, we are told, have come 80 or 90 percent of the way to a peace deal, so reluctant to promote it? I can identify four main reasons: - Tactics. Both leaders believe that a
tough stance at home will win them more at the negotiating table.
In his verbal sparring with the international mediators, Aliyev
was evidently trying to put pressure on them to do more for Azerbaijan.
Kocharian may be calculating that - Home and abroad. Clearly the presidents
find it easier to imagine a peace settlement in Florida than
back home. Many in the region are critical of the Americans in
particular for "rushing" the process. The potential
danger here is that the two leaders might sign up to - Character. Neither man is a democrat.
Aliyev is a former Politburo member, who has rigged all the elections
he has held since coming to power. Kocharian was the war-time
leader of the Karabakh Armenians. Both men energetically pursued
the "military option" over Karabakh in - Power. For both men self-preservation would seem to be the highest goal- higher than peace and prosperity. Ultimately both men may decide that the cost of signing up to a peace agreement is too high and that they could be swept away by the storms of protest it arouses. What Next? Clearly there are reasons why undemocratic
leaders can actually do more in a peace process. The political
base they need to consult with is narrow. They have to worry
less about elections. They can simply ignore the nationalist
consensus that still grips their respective And yet the lack of trust between authoritarian leaders and their publics, is now the biggest problem for the Caucasus in general and the Karabakh peace process in particular. What can be done? Three of the biggest
problems of the Karabakh dispute are: (i) The two sides live
in deep isolation from one another. (ii) Public opinion in both
countries is sceptical or Why not take existing elements of the
framework agreement and incorporate them into a "phased"
or "step by step" plan, in which some of the thornier
problems (such as security issues and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh
itself) were postponed until later? The Armenians These are not hard-and-fast proposals,
merely examples of the kind of mutual concessions that either
side could make without surrendering their fundamental interests.
I recognize that the example of the "phased" agreement
in the Middle East is not encouraging. Opponents ********************************************************************** CR is registered as a charity in the UK
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